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I. INTRODUCTION
Buried in the arcanum of bankruptcy law is an obscure distinction
between "proceedings" and "controversies" in bankruptcy. The jurisdic-
tion of the courts of appeals of the United States occasionally depends
upon the application of these two terms, resulting in disparate polemics
which Congress in 1938 strove to eliminate. The necessity of distinguish-
ing between the two persists, however, when interlocutory orders are
sought to be appealed, and the advent of modern discovery has spawned
new complexities. This article will examine the appealability as of right
of interlocutory discovery orders in bankruptcy, with emphasis upon the
law of the Fifth Circuit.'
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law; former Associate Editor, University of
Miami Law Review; former Student Instructor of Legal Research and Writing; presently
serving as Law Clerk to the Honorable David W. Dyer, United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Judicial Circuit. The views contained in this article do not purport to indicate the
views of Judge Dyer.
1. The initial research for this article was begun in the author's capacity as law clerk
to the Honorable David W. Dyer, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
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A. The Provisions of Section 24
The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is set forth in section 24
of the Bankruptcy Act.' Under section 24, no order involving less than
$500 is appealable except upon allowance by the court of appeals.' As to
orders involving $500 or more, appeal is as of right if the order is final.
If the order is interlocutory, appeal may be as of right or only upon al-
lowance by the court (or not at all). Whether a right of appeal from an
interlocutory order exists depends upon the nature of the order and the
nature of the proceeding in which it was entered, and it is in this regard
that the troublesome distinction between "proceedings" and "controver-
sies" appears. 4
An interlocutory order or judgment in bankruptcy is appealable as
of right if it is entered in a "proceeding in bankruptcy."5 If the interlocu-
tory order is entered in a "controversy arising in proceedings in bank-
ruptcy," it is not appealable unless the statutes governing appeals gen-
erally would permit an appeal from the particular order.6
Aside from the jurisdictional amount, certain judicial limitations
upon the right of appeal from an interlocutory order in a "proceeding"
in bankruptcy have been imposed. "[T]he statutory right to appeal from
interlocutory orders of necessity requires that such orders be restricted
to those having a definite operative 'finality' . . . ."7 There must also be
Fifth Circuit, during the pendency of Schwarz & Cohen v. Brock, No. 26685 (5th Cir.,
Nov. 8, 1968). Although that case presented to the Fifth Circuit the jurisdictional question
which is the topic of this article, the case was dismissed as moot, and the court conse-
quently did not reach the merits. The views contained in this article are solely those of the
author and neither could nor do indicate how that court would decide the question were it
properly presented.
2. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 854, as amended, Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992; Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 9, 66 Stat. 423. The act is
codified in 11 U.S.C.A. § 47 (1969). All United States statutory citations in this article will
hereafter be to UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED without further cross-references except
where noted to the corresponding section in the Bankruptcy Act.
3. This is true both of final and of interlocutory orders, although prior to the 1938
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act all final orders in "controversies arising in bankruptcy
proceedings" were appealable as of right regardless of the amount in controversy.
4. For purposes of this article, use of the words "proceedings" and "controversies" in
quotation marks indicates their use according to the specialized meaning which they have in
§ 24 of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 24 of the Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 47 (1969), refers to
"proceedings in bankruptcy" and "controversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy," and
in this regard the words have a meaning different from the ordinary usage of these
relatively common words. Perhaps because of the familiar usage of the words, "[t]he
distinction between cases which are 'proceedings in bankruptcy' . . . and those which are
'controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings' . . . is not always clear nor easily stated."
In re McMahon, 147 F. 684, 689 (6th Cir. 1906).
Confusion also results from the use of the same words, with different meanings, in
different portions of the act itself. The phrases have different meanings in §§ 23(a) and
24(a) of the Act. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY g 24.08 (1968). But see Liddon & Bros. v.
Smith, 135 F. 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1905).
5. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.04 (1968).
6. Id. See also id. at 1 24.27.
7. Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1962).
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a "substantial interest" in the order,8 and whether multiple appeals would
result must also be considered.9 Additionally, the order must be disposi-
tive of something and not "trivial" in its effect upon the proceeding.'
B. "Proceedings" and "Controversies"
The statute investing jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, section
24, reads in pertinent part as follows:
The United States courts of appeals ... are invested with
appellate jurisdiction from the several courts of bankruptcy in
their respective jurisdictions in proceedings in bankruptcy,
either interlocutory or final, and in controversies arising in pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy, to review, affirm, revise, or reverse,
both in matters of law and in matters of fact . .. .
This section is the culmination of attempts by Congress to cure what had
by 1938 become a troublesome area. In some regards the Chandler Act
of 1938,12 the present section 24, did eliminate problems in appellate ju-
risdiction in bankruptcy. The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals was
extended to review of both matters of law and matters of fact, whereas
formerly review of factual matters had been possible only in "controver-
sies," with review in "proceedings" restricted solely to matters of law.'
The act also virtually eliminated problems of whether appeal had to be
by permission or whether it was of right. 4 The Chandler Act did not,
however, entirely eliminate the vexatious distinction between "proceed-
ings" and "controversies," and the distinction still remains with regard to
appeals from interlocutory orders.' 5
Courts have offered a variety of general definitions of "proceedings"
and "controversies," none of which is particularly useful in determining
whether a particular set of facts fits within either term. The most com-
mon general definition of "proceedings in bankruptcy" is that they "are
those matters of an administrative character, including questions between
the bankrupt and his creditors, which are presented in the ordinary course
of the administration of the bankrupt's estate."' "Controversies" are
considered to
include those matters arising in the course of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, which are not mere steps in the ordinary administration
of the bankrupt estate, but present, by intervention or other-
wise, distinct and separable issues between the trustee and ad-
8. Berl v. Crutcher, 60 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 1932).
9. Theard v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 202 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1953).
10. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Freeman, 197 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1952).
11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 47(a) (1969).
12. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 854.
13. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.41 (1968).
14. See id. at ff 24.04.
15. See id. at f1 24.37.
16. Taylor v. Voss, 271 U.S. 176, 181 (1926).
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verse claimants concerning the right and title to the bankrupt's
estate.
17
As any number of doubtful cases would quickly illustrate, the above
generalizations are useful only as generalizations. It is only through a
categorization of particular fact patterns that any deeper meaning can
begin to attach. The definitions are useful, however, in establishing the
vague, general distinction between the two: "proceedings" arise in the
administration of the bankrupt's estate and deal with questions between
the trustee and the general creditors, while "controversies" are more than
merely administrative of the bankrupt's estate and give rise to distinct
and separable issues between the trustee and adverse claimants affecting
the extent of the estate to be distributed.'
II. "PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY"' 9
A. Selection and Accounting of Trustee
The appointment or removal of bankruptcy officials such as the
trustee or receiver and referees is considered an administrative step in
the course of the bankruptcy action which constitutes a "proceeding."20
Not only is the discharge of such an official as a receiver a "proceeding,"'"
but the orders settling the accounts of such officers are also. Even though
such orders may be interlocutory, appeal will lie as of right once given
the jurisdictional amount.
B. Fees and Administrative Expenses
There seems to be little question regarding the classification of or-
ders relating to fees and administrative expenses as "proceedings," as
these rather clearly fall within the general definition. An order relating
to fees for the trustee or receiver and the attorney for the receiver is a
"proceeding." 22
C. Exemptions
An order holding property claimed by the bankrupt as exempt due
to homestead laws23 or other statutes24 arises in a "proceeding." This
17. Id. at 180-81.
18. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY J 24.12 and 24.27; Taylor v. Voss, 271
U.S. 176, 180-81 (1926).
19. The outline for this section is taken from 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9ff 24.13-24.26
(1968).
20. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 24.13 (1968). See also Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v.
Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Shoreland Oil Co. v. Conklin, 30 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1929).
22. Id. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY lilT 24.14-24.15 (1968). The question of
the appealability of a series of orders allowing interim fees to a trustee and his attorney,
being attacked as excessive, is presently being presented in a group of combined appeals to
the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brock, No. 26479 (5th Cir.,
argued orally Oct. 22, 1968). Jurisdiction of these appeals may be affected by the special
provisions of 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 606 and 650 (1969).
23. Gulbransen Co. v. Couch, 61 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1932).
74. Southern Engine & Pump Co. v. Pagel Elec. & Ice Co., 16 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1926).
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question clearly constitutes one between the bankrupt and the general
creditors, as often it will be the bankrupt himself who asserts the exemp-
tion.25
D. Sales and Distribution of Property
Probably one of the most important categories of "proceedings,"
and one in which the advisability of interlocutory appeal most clearly
appears, is the class of orders directing that certain property be sold or
distributed from the bankrupt's estate. Rather than delay an appeal
from such an order until a time when the property may have been
removed from the jurisdiction of the court or may have been irretrieva-
bly lost or sold, an interlocutory appeal regarding the particular property
is desirable. Such an appeal also has the advantage of enabling the con-
tinuation of the rest of the proceedings without causing a disruption of
orderly administration. 6
"Proceedings" are generally considered to constitute the ordinary
administrative matters of the processes of the bankruptcy court, and "the
sale and disposition of the bankrupt's effects, are regular steps or pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy .. .."" Thus, payment to a creditor out of the
proceeds of a sale by the trustee2 and questions regarding rights upon
a sale or purported sale21 will also be termed "proceedings." The same
is true of questions regarding the return of surplus assets to the bank-
rupt. °
E. Claims and Liens
In most instances, an order allowing or rejecting a debt or claim is
a "proceeding,"'" although where a lien is incidental to or combined with
the debt, the dispute may constitute a "controversy. 81 2 Prior to 1938, the
Bankruptcy Act provided that a "judgment allowing or rejecting a debt
or claim of five hundred dollars or over" was a "proceeding" within a
class of three exceptions which were appealable as of right.88 Claims and
debts have the same status under the present section 24.
Where the allowance or rejection of a debt or claim combined with
25. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.17 (1968). See also Adams v.
Walicek, 9 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1925); Duncan v. Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co., 150 F.
269 (5th Cir. 1907).
26. Unnecessary delays have been sharply criticized. See Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v.
Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362, 364-370 (5th Cir. 1962) (appeal from order allowing
amendment to involuntary bankruptcy petition and denying motion to vacate receiver).
27. Schuler v. Hassinger, 177 F. 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1910).
28. First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280, 291 (1905).
29. Untereiner v. Camors, 228 F. 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1916). But cf. In re J. Jungmann,
Inc., 186 F. 302, 304-305 (2d Cir. 1911).
30. Berl v. Crutcher, 60 F.2d 440 passim (5th Cir. 1932).
31. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY fr 24.19 (1968).
32. See id. at 1 24.33.
33. See Act of May 27, 1926, 44 Stat. 662. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Holliday, 47
F.2d 67, 69 (5th Cir. 1931) ; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 24.03 (1968). Compare First Nat'l
Bank v. Holliday, supra, with In re Whitener, 105 F. 180, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1900). Cf.
Gregg Grain Co. v. Walker Grain Co., 285 F. 156, 157 (5th Cir. 1922).
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the assertion of a lien is sought to be appealed, the appeal constitutes a
"proceeding. '3 4 This status results from the allowance of the claim be-
ing a "proceeding," with the assertion of the lien merely incidental to
the primary claim of the debt. 5 If the claim or debt is undisputed, how-
ever, and the assertion is that of a lien, then the matter is a "contro-
versy," an appeal from which requires a final order.8 That the distinc-
tion is at times difficult to make is apparent from a group of Fifth Circuit
decisions which evidently are in conflict.3 7
F. Stays and Injunctons
A stay or injunction issued by the bankruptcy court is a "proceed-
ing."38 The injunctions may require a variety of acts or forebearances,
relating both to the bankrupt's property or to the proceedings them-
selves. 9 Whether the injunction or an order dissolving an injunction is
appealed, all are considered administrative in nature and hence "pro-
ceedings."40
34. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 235 (1909); In re Jones, 294 F. 832, 833 (5th Cir.
1923); Liddon & Bros. v. Smith, 135 F. 43, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1905).
35. Hutchinson v. Otis, 190 U.S. 552 (1903).
36. Globe Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin, 236 U.S. 288 (1915).
37. Compare Wuerpel v. Commercial Germania Trust & Say. Bank, 238 F. 269 (5th
Cir. 1917) and Stuart v. Britton Lumber Co., 227 F. 49 (5th Cir. 1915) with J.M. Radford
Grocery Co. v. Powell, 228 F. 1 (5th Cir. 1915).
In the Stuart case, supra, a creditor asserted a claim for lumber furnished to the bank-
rupt for building houses, the claim being secured by liens on each house built. The court
held that the claim was for the total amount, with the liens being simply incidental to the
primary dispute because they were merely specific security for the claim. Thus the matter
was a "controversy" and appeal was the proper mode of review.
In the Wuerpel case, following a sale of goods the bankrupt-vendor assigned an invoice
against the vendee to the creditor-bank as security for the bankrupt's note. The creditor-
bank notified the vendee of the transfer and of its interest in the account, requesting the
vendee to remit payment directly to it as a creditor of the account debtor. The vendee,
however, erroneously sent its draft to the bankrupt, the bankrupt deposited it to its account
at another bank, and the bank collected the draft. There was no dispute as to the claim
itself but only as to whether the creditor-bank had priority through an equitable lien upon
the traceable funds, as the trustee was willing to allow an unsecured claim in the amount
of the draft. The court held that the dispute was over ownership of a fund and not over
the claim itself. Hence the appeal was allowed as a "controversy."
In the Radford Grocery case, part of the assets of the adjudicated bankrupt's estate
were the proceeds of four fire insurance policies, each of which had been assigned to the
creditor. Before filing the petition for bankruptcy, the bankrupt sustained a fire loss on the
policies, and part of the proceeds, paid to the trustee, were for certain fixtures against which
the creditor held a chattel mortgage. The creditor presented a lien upon the insurance
fund, which the district court in reversing the referee denied. On review from this order
both by appeal, as a "controversy," and by petition to revise, as a "proceeding," the appeal
was dismissed.
Perhaps this latter case, which conflicts with the others and the majority view, partakes
equally of the aspects of an assertion of a claim and of an assertion of a lien, and thus is
merely an aberration limited to its facts. The decision is somewhat surprising, however, in
that two judges were common to both this case and the Wuerpel case, with which it most
directly conflicts, although neither wrote either opinion.
38. Meyer v. Kenmore Granville Hotel Co., 297 U.S. 160, 165 (1936) ; cf. In re Purvine,
96 F. 192, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1899).
39. See 2 CoLLrER oN BANKRUPTCY ff 24.20 (1968).
40. Id.
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G. Turnover Orders
Depending primarily upon whom the order directs, an order requir-
ing property.to be surrendered to the estate may be either a "proceeding"
or a "controversy." Orders directed against the bankrupt or his agent
are considered "proceedings,"'" while orders against third persons con-
stitute "controversies.
'11
2
H. Civil Contempts
An order finding a person in civil contempt or discharging a rule
to show cause why contempt should not be adjudged is considered a "pro-
ceeding."4 An order adjudging a person guilty of criminal contempt,
however, is considered neither a "proceeding" nor a "controversy" but
rather a criminal proceeding. 4 The criminal contempt proceeding is not
related to the bankrupt's estate but to the court's power to preserve or-
der in proceedings before it.
45
Whether a civil contempt constitutes a "proceeding" will rarely be
important, as such orders generally are final. Even where an interlocutory
fine is assessed, appeal could only be by allowance should the amount
involved be less than $500.46
I. Miscellaneous "Proceedings"
A number of orders which are primarily administrative of the bank-
rupt's estate also are considered "proceedings." An order approving a
plan for reorganization,47 denying a creditor voting rights regarding a
plan of reorganization,48 granting or refusing to grant leave to amend a
petition in bankruptcy, 49 relating to a dispute over a compromise between
the trustee and creditors, 0 or a host of others may constitute a "pro-
ceeding."5
41. Moore v. Lane, 84 F.2d 553, 554 (8th Cir. 1936); cf. In re Purvine, 96 F. 192,
193-94 (5th Cir. 1899). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 24.21 (1968).
42. In re Christ's Church of the Golden Rule, 172 F.2d 523 passim (9th Cir. 1949).
See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY fT 24.22 (1968).
43. City of Clearwater, Fla. v. Beers, 90 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1937). See generally
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY IT 24.22 (1968).
44. Wakefield v. Housel, 288 F. 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1923). See generally 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ff 24.35 (1968).
45. Morehouse v. Pacific Hardware & Steel Co., 177 F. 337, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1910).
46. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY fT 24.22 (1968).
47. Texas Hotel Sec. Corp. v. Waco Dev. Co., 87 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937).
48. Id.
49. In re Reichert, 73 F.2d 56, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd sub nom. Lerner v. First. Wis.
Nat'l Bank, 294 U.S. 116 (1935).
50. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Ben L. Berwald Shoe Co., 10 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1925).
51. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY IflI 24.23-24.26 (1968).
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III. "CONTROVERSIES ARISING IN PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY" 52
A. Disputes over Title to Property
Proceedings involving a dispute over title to property between the
trustee of the bankrupt's estate and adverse third party claimants con-
stitute a "controversy," appeals from which require a final order.5" It
matters not who has possession of the property, nor how possession was
obtained, nor how the dispute arose.54 Thus, an injunction against an
action in another court which affects the title to property claimed to be
in the bankrupt's estate could be appealed as a "controversy."55 "How-
ever, where the parties agree to allow the sale of the property on the
understanding that the proceeds will go to the one in whom title to the
property is found to exist by the court, the cases are divided as to
whether this is a 'controversy' or a 'proceeding.' "56 The Fifth Circuit
has taken the view, criticized as inconsistent,57 that the matter is trans-
formed into a "proceeding" even though title to the property remains the
central issue.58 Additionally, where a partnership is involved in the bank-
ruptcy, a dispute may be a "controversy" even where the bankrupt's
estate is not primarily involved.59
B. Reclamation Proceedings
Reclamation proceedings by an intervening third party constitute a
"controversy" according to the majority view,60 and judging by its latest
statement this also is the view of the Fifth Circuit. That court, however,
has some decisions in conflict.
In Marion Machine Foundry & Supply Company v. Girand6' a cred-
itor sold goods on credit to the bankrupt, provided that the bankrupt
would first pay a prior debt. The bankrupt generously paid the prior
debt with a check which was later dishonored. The creditor filed a peti-
tion for the proceeds of the sale of the goods by the bankrupt's receivers,
and on appeal from its denial the Fifth Circuit held that the question
presented was a "purely legal one, and arose in an ordinary administra-
52. The outline for this section is taken from 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ffff 24.29-24.36
(1968).
53. Bank of Ragland v. Hudson, 247 F. 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1918); McCarty v. Coffin,
150 F. 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1907); Liddon & Bros. v. Smith, 135 F. 43, 46 (5th Cir. 1905).
54. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY g 24.29 (1968).
55. Cf. Leco Properties, Inc. v. R.E. Crummer & Co., 128 F.2d 110, 112 (5th Cir.
1942), criticized as neither necessary nor responsive to arguments, Universal Oil Prod. Co.
v. Cosden Petroleum Corp., 178 F.2d 495, 497 (5th Cir. 1949).
56. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 24.29, at 771 (1968).
57. Id.
58. Marion Mach. Foundry & Supply Co. v. Girand, 285 F. 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1922).
59. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.29 (1968).
60. See id. at 1 24.31 n.1 and cases cited therein.
61. 285 F. 160 (5th Cir. 1922).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
tive proceeding in bankruptcy." 2 In several later cases, however, the
Fifth Circuit has adamantly treated reclamation proceedings as present-
ing separable issues and hence being "controversies."6 " Each of those de-
cisions studiously avoided mention of the Marion Machine Foundry
decision, and perhaps the case should be considered as overruled sub
silentio. This is probably a fitting treatment of the case in view of its
otherwise rather sordid history. It has been obliquely criticized by
another circuit,64 has been termed inconsistent by a leading authority,"
and has been followed only as to a peripheral point dealing with fraud.66
Even as to the question on fraud the case has not fared well: in lauding
it, the Second Circuit claimed it as its own.17 Undoubtedly the Fifth Cir-
cuit would be quite willing to let the Second Circuit keep it.
C. Suits Against Trustees and Receivers
"A suit against a trustee or receiver in the bankruptcy court for
personal negligence constitutes a 'controversy arising in proceedings in
bankruptcy.' 1168 However, a suit against a trustee seeking to charge him
with property which came into his possession and was not accounted for
has been held to be a "proceeding." 69 From the fact that the latter suit
is separable from the remainder of the proceedings and does present a
dispute over title to property claimed to be in the bankrupt's estate, it
would appear that the better view would be that such a suit presents a
,(controversy."
D. Miscellaneous "Controversies"
A number of various other suits have been held to be "controver-
sies." In certain instances disputes over liens have been held to be "con-
troversies, 70 and criminal contempts fall within the same category. 71
Plenary suits to set aside preferential or fraudulent transfers have been
held to constitute "controversies, ' 72 although there is today some ques-
tion whether they are at all appealable under section 24 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act as either "proceedings" or "controversies. ' '7 1 Additionally,
62. Id. at 161.
63. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Freeman, 197 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Hopkins
v. Nat'l Shawmut Bank, 293 F. 884, 885 (5th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 722 (1924).
64. See In re Smith-Flynn Comm'n Co., 292 F. 465, 467 (8th Cir. 1923).
65. See note 60 supra.
66. See In re Pejepscot Paper Co., 22 F. Supp. 888, 890 (D. Me. 1938).
67. See In re Independent Coal Corp., 18 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1927).
68. 2 COLLIER ON BANXRUPTCY " 24.34, at 782 (1968).
69. In re Moore & Bridgeman, 166 F. 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1909).
70. See text at 373 supra.
71. See text at 372 supra.
72. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY fr 24.32 (1968).
73. Id. See also Diaz v. Crom, 195 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 841
(1952).
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orders approving a compromise have been held to be reviewable as "con-
troversies." 4
IV. INTERLOCUTORY DISCOVERY ORDERS
As the preceding examples of "proceedings" and "controversies"
amply illustrate, whether a particular order is appealable as one or the
other is not always clear. Further muddling the issue is the fact that
some orders constitute neither, despite the initial "either-or" impression
given by section 24. While interlocutory orders in "controversies" are
generally not appealable 75 and such orders in "proceedings" generally
are, these generalities, like those which attempt to define the two classifi-
cations of orders, are not absolutes. Even in a "proceeding," no one could
seriously contend that an order recessing the proceedings for five minutes
is appealable.
Thus there have evolved judicial limitations upon the appealability
of orders in "proceedings." Appealable orders must have a degree of
"finality," be at least marginally dispositive of some issue, or involve some
"substantial interest" of the parties involved. 76 The class of orders which
does not so qualify as appealable orders in "proceedings" is generally
termed the "trivial matter" exception.7 7 Such at least is the categoriza-
tion by courts, but it is the primary thesis of this article that a slightly
different approach to this class of non-appealable interlocutory orders in
"proceedings" would more accurately reflect the purpose behind establish-
ing the class. Discovery orders are a good example, and the remainder of
this article will seek to glean from the cases dealing with such orders a
thread in common with other interlocutory orders in "proceedings."
A. The Amount in Controversy
It is a requisite of appeal as of right under section 24 that the order
appealed from involve $500 or more, whether the order is entered in
a "proceeding" or a "controversy." 78 Thus in order not to obviate the
appealability of a discovery order altogether, that amount must be pres-
ent, as otherwise appeal would lie only upon allowance by the court of
appeals. 79 In interpreting the $500 amount provision, the courts have
74. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Ben L. Berwald Shoe Co., 10 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.
1925). See text at 372 supra.
75. The exceptions are those orders in which other statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b)
(1969), provide for interlocutory appeal.
76. See text at 367-68 supra.
77. See Henry Ansbacher & Co. v. Klebanow, 362 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1966). In City of
Fort Lauderdale v. Freeman, 197 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1952), the court stated at 124:
[I]t is a wise and salutary rule that appeals from interlocutory orders in bank-
ruptcy, which ... are trivial in their effect on the proceedings, which are dispositive
of nothing, are not reviewable, and appeals therefrom should be dismissed.
78. 11 U.S.C.A. § 47(a) (1969).
79. Id.
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stressed the necessity that the order "involve" $500 or more. Although
an order holding a person involved in the bankruptcy proceedings in
contempt does not literally "involve" $500, it obviously "involves" some-
thing of greater importance. Because of this the words of the statute have
not been construed literally, and instead the courts have construed the
limitation as one "designed to exclude trifling disputes.""0 The require-
ment has come to mean that the non-appealable order must involve
money alone and less than $500,81 and this reasoning would appear to
bring discovery orders within the class of orders "involving" $500 or
more.
B. Section 1292(b)
Section 1292(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides the
normal method of interlocutory appeal. Under section 1292(b) appeals
from specified interlocutory orders are permitted, and occasionally this
will occur in a "controversy" in bankruptcy.82 A discovery order is not
one of those specified in that section, however, and therefore interlocu-
tory appeal of such orders in bankruptcy must occur only if they are
within the class of appealable orders in "proceedings."
C. Discovery as a "Proceeding"
1. THE CASES
Various circuits of the courts of appeals are generating their own
controversy over the applicability of appeal as of right under section 24
to interlocutory discovery orders. In Henry Ansbacher & Co. v. Kleba-
now8" the Second Circuit culminated a line of decisions, primarily from
that circuit, by accepting jurisdiction of an appeal from an order reversing
a referee's order which had suppressed interrogatories, holding that the
order,
although interlocutory, is appealable under 24(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act . . .as an order entered in a "proceeding in bank-
ruptcy" as distinguished from "a controversy arising in pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy . . . ." Discovery matters are of an
administrative character. They are not actions within the bank-
ruptcy action affecting title to a bankrupt's estate, appealable
only when a final order has been entered. They are "proceed-
ings" in bankruptcy, and in the case at bar the order is of
sufficient significance to avoid the "trivial matter" exception
judicially engrafted on the statute.... .
80. Robertson v. Berger, 102 F.2d 530, 531 (2d Cir. 1939). See also In re Winton Shirt
Corp., 104 F.2d 777, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1939).
81. Id.
82. See text at 375 supra.
83. 362 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1966).
84. Id. at 570.
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The Second Circuit in 1922 was one of the first to classify a form of dis-
covery order, relating to an examination under section 21(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act,80 as an order entered in a "proceeding." In In re A. &
W. Nesbitt,8 that court reversed an order eliminating an individual from
a section 21(a) examination. The following year it did the opposite, re-
versing an order compelling a foreign resident to submit to such an ex-
amination.17 Thereafter that circuit considered an order denying a motion
to limit the issues in a 21(a) examination,88 an order limiting a 21(a)
examination,8 9 and an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena as
arising in "proceedings in bankruptcy."9 ° The Third Circuit followed the
Second's lead regarding an order compelling a section 21(a) examina-
tion.91
In 1952 the Sixth Circuit took issue with this line of cases in In re
Manufacturers Trading Corporation." In its decision the court held that
an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum, even though
admittedly arising in a "proceeding," was not an appealable order under
section 24. The court noted that "[d] ue regard for the efficiency and dis-
patch of the proceedings necessitates a common-sense interpretation of
[section 24] in order that the right to appeal be limited within reason-
able bounds. . . ."I' The court went on to state:
The action before us is not one that arises with respect to
the administration of the debtor's estate. The issuance of a sub-
poena duces tecum does not peculiarly partake of the nature of
a bankruptcy proceeding, and is not a part of the administration
of the estate. An order denying a motion to quash such a sub-
poena is not an order in a bankruptcy proceeding proper. Such
an order could not remotely be considered as an administrative
order made in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings. The
order denying the motion to quash is, therefore, not of the class
of proceedings which is reviewable on appeal. Even though it
might affect some substantial right of appellant, it is not a pro-
ceeding in bankruptcy from which an appeal can be taken as
in the case of the usual interlocutory order made in the admin-
istration of the estate. For the order denying the motion to
quash does not substantially determine any issue in the proceed-
ing; and an interlocutory order which determines nothing is not
appealable. .... 94
85. 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1969).
86. 282 F. 265 (2d Cir. 1922).
87. In re Youroveta Home & Foreign Trade Co., 288 F. 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1923).
88. In re Moore, 77 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1935).
89. In re Bush Terminal Co., 105 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1939).
90. In re Equitable Plan Co., 272 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1959).
91. In re Eastern Utilities Investing Corp., 98 F.2d 620, 622 (3d Cir. 1938).
92. 194 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1952).
93. Id. at 953.
94. Id.
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The weight of the case as authority may not be crushing. Its force-
fulness must stem more from the validity of its reasoning than from
unanimity. Of the three judges on the panel, one vigorously dissented and
another merely concurred in the result, noting that it was "not essential
that the court should resolve all the technical differences developed in the
respective opinions of [his] respected colleagues."95
2. THE NORMATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
An assessment of the validity of the differing views upon the appeal-
ability of interlocutory discovery orders in bankruptcy, requires the con-
sideration of a number of factors. A natural starting point would be an
interpretation of the intent of Congress in passing section 24, for after
all, it is a statute. Other factors are the judicial approach to interpreting
and limiting section 24, the general desirability of interlocutory appeals
from discovery orders, and the usefulness of other available methods of
interlocutory appeal.
With regard to discovery being a "proceeding," the intent of Con-
gress is not very obvious. Although it realized the impact of providing
for appeal as of right when it was considering the Chandler Act in 1938,
it also realized that whether a particular set of facts would constitute a
"proceeding" was a question best left to case by case determination in
the courts. Perhaps in the occasionally used "condonation" approach there
could be some support for the proposition that, at least as to section 21
(a) examinations, Congress intended orders granting or limiting discov-
ery to be appealable as of right. If, however, Congress by knowing that
appeals from such orders had been allowed prior to 1938 intended their
appealability as of right thereafter, it was strangely silent. Academic
honesty would seem to preclude the conclusion that Congress approved
such appeals by its silence, even assuming that in its omniscience Con-
gress knew of the cases, comprehended their impact, and somehow
intended its silence to have meaning.
Neither is an examination of the judicial approach to interpreting
section 24 particularly illuminating. The definitions of "proceedings" and
"controversies" are quite vague, in keeping with the vagueness of the
terms they purport to elucidate. However, the courts have at times lim-
ited the applicability of the provisions of section 24, and they have in
doing so made general statements as to why. Thus, in a general way the
statements may be of value.
Normative considerations regarding the desirability of interlocutory
appeal of discovery orders should also be considered. It is important to
analyze the effects of providing for such appeals, as the judiciary often
must make a determination based on long range effects. In creating or
changing this particular right, the courts must consider not only the
95. Id. at 959 (concurring opinion of Martin, J.).
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costs of judicial administration stemming from an expansion of appellate
jurisdiction, but also how equitably to resolve the conflicting economic
and personal rights of the litigants and how properly to protect the pub-
lic at large. "Congress enacted the bankruptcy statute in the exercise of
public policy, for the benefit, not of debtors, but of society at large,"96
and "it was thought best by Congress to prescribe general rules, which
would usually promote satisfactory results, notwithstanding the fact that
in isolated instances it would be difficult, if not impossible, to attain the
standards of exact justice.19 7 While society is concerned about justice for
the litigants, it must also be concerned about the costs of the administra-
tion of justice and swift determination of litigation. The judiciary must
decipher and apply societal concern.
To allow an appeal as of right from an interlocutory discovery order
conflicts with the general rule that only final judgments are appealable as
of right. Federal law has required a final judgment for appellate review
since the Judiciary Act of 1789,98 and today it remains a precondition of
jurisdiction in the United States courts of appeals.9 9 For various reasons
and in different manners, however, interlocutory orders are occasionally
reviewable. The most common method of interlocutory review is pursu-
ant to section 1292, °0 although immediate review of a protested order
may also be possible through dismissal and default, the use of extraor-
dinary writs by the appellate court, contempt proceedings, or the
collateral orders doctrine. 0 1
3. ORDERS GRANTING DISCOVERY
Problems regarding orders improperly granting discovery are essen-
tially dual: the improperly discovered material may be improperly
admitted at trial or the rights of a litigant or other individual, particu-
larly with regard to the work product of an attorney or privilege, may
be violated. When the former occurs, it is usually necessary to object to the
introduction of the evidence at trial in order to preserve error on appeal.'0 2
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a measure of pro-
tection for procedural irregularities in securing discovery, as by a pro-
tective order,10 3 review seems desirable when the trial court erroneously
orders discovery in violation of a privilege. To submit to discovery
renders the problem moot, eliminating consideration of the error by an
appellate court, while refusal necessitates a review which is less than
96. Bank of Elberton v. Swift, 268 F. 305, 308 (5th Cir. 1920).
97. Albin v. Cowing Pressure Relieving Joint Co., 317 U.S. 211, 212 (1942).
98. Act of September 24, 1789 §§ 21, 22 and 25, 1 Stat. 83-85.
99. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1969).
100. See page 376 supra.
101. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. Rv. 940,
995-1000 (1961).
102. Mins v. Central Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1949).
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b). 1'
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likely to succeed because the test on review is whether the trial court
abused its discretion. 0
4
4. ORDERS DENYING DISCOVERY
Where a denial of discovery is erroneous, it seems desirable to allow
interlocutory appeal, for the reason that it is quite difficult to show
prejudice following the trial if what is sought to be discovered is not
known to some degree.' However, there remains the possibility that
despite a denial of access to rightfully discoverable information the
affected party may win, thus rendering the problem moot. Additionally,
the denial is reviewable on appeal and under proper circumstances may
result in reversal for abuse of discretion."'0
5. THE PECULIARITIES
Problems regarding the grant or denial of discovery are somewhat
the same in bankruptcy as in other areas, although because of the nature
of section 21(a) examinations and the possible availability of contempt
proceedings as a "proceeding" there may be some differences. It is as
true in bankruptcy as elsewhere that persons whose rights or privileges
may be violated by discovery of certain information must be protected,
and it is also true that persons may be subjected to injustice should
needed information be sheltered. Both such classes are better protected
through the use of interlocutory appeals, but to provide for them is to
furnish a ready vehicle for delaying or harassing tactics by an opponent,
in turn resulting in economic waste both to the parties and to the courts
and public. Present procedure attempts to strike an equitable equilibrium
in the former area by allowing the trial judge an extensive latitude of
power and discretion designed to permit all but the most sacrosanct in-
formation to be discovered. In keeping with the intent to broaden the
availability of information through wider discovery procedures, it is
necessary to cause those who would refuse to submit to discovery to be
hesitant to do so. One aspect of lessening desire to refuse discovery is to
deny immediate review. This in turn speeds up trials and lessens the costs
of the administration of justice.
Unfortunately, trial courts make errors. As a remedy, some form of
appellate review must be provided. The question is whether immediate
interlocutory appeal is the answer, and this question has been answered
in the negative in other areas of the law.
Where discovery is denied, the costs of discovery must be weighed
against the necessity of obtaining information. Even to allow an appeal
104. See Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914, 918 (5th Cir. 1955) (dictum); In re
Mfrs. Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 948, 960 (6th Cir. 1952).
105. See Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAhv. L. R.v. 940, 993 (1961).
It is thereby also quite difficult to show that the denial probably affected the result.
106. Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1956).
APPEALABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY
may not be attractive to the conscientious attorney, as he must also weigh
the costs and time of an appeal against his chances of winning absent the
information sought. However, to the delaying or harassing party the
concern for economy may not be so acute, nor the denial of discovery so
prejudicial to legal rights.
The section 21(a) examination is a bankruptcy aberration which
merits some attention in this area. These examinations are authorized by
a section of the act which, when printed in the statute books, constitutes
a congressional fishing license for all manner of existent and nonexistent
game. The trustee may delve and probe in a virtually unrestricted quest
to obtain information regarding the possible assets of the bankrupt's
estate. Although the normal rules of civil procedure regarding bank-
ruptcy are available in bankruptcy actions,'07 it is arguable that an order
granting or denying a section 21 (a) examination is a "proceeding" in
bankruptcy due to its peculiarity to bankruptcy actions.
It is possible to argue that an order denying discovery in bank-
ruptcy has a sufficient degree of finality to be classified as a "proceeding."
Once the process of discovering information is curtailed, as to matters
yet undiscovered the process is to a degree "final." There is in this
regard some "degree of finality."'0 8 Additionally, it is probable that the
action could otherwise continue unaffected by an interlocutory appeal.
It is important also to note that it may at times be possible for a
party to secure review of a civil contempt order. In most instances civil
contempt orders will be unquestionably appealable under section 24 of
the Bankruptcy Act, since they are usually final orders. Under section 24
any final order meeting the jurisdictional amount is appealable as of
right whether it is entered in a "proceeding" or a "controversy." Of
course, if the contempt is punished by a simple compensatory fine, the
order is interlocutory and appealability remains an issue.109 As to this
issue there have been differences of opinion,"' but it seems that the con-
tempt is considered as arising in a "proceeding.""'
V. ADJUDICATION vERSUS ADMINISTRATION
It is the thesis of this article that to allow appeal from an interlocu-
tory discovery order is to misplace the emphasis in the generally accepted
definitions of "proceedings," thereby transforming an ordinary adjudica-
tory proceeding into an extraordinary administrative "proceeding." To
107. Gen. Order 37, General Orders in Bankruptcy Adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States. Cf. Gen. Order 22.
108. See Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1962)
("definite operative finality").
109. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY f 24.22 n.7 (1968). Cf. City of Clearwater, Fla.
v. Beers, 90 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1937).
110. Compare City of Clearwater, Fla. v. Beers, 90 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1937) with
Kirsner v. Taliaferro, 202 F. 51, 54-56 (4th Cir. 1912).
Ill. As will appear later in this article, it is the writer's view that contempt orders are
not within the usual class of "proceedings." See page 384 infra.
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classify discovery as a "proceeding in bankruptcy" is to ignore the fact
that discovery is a part of the process of adjudication of bankruptcy,
rather than a step in the administration of the bankrupt's estate.
The process of adjudicating bankruptcy is from beginning to end
a legal process utilizing legal procedures. Though in some respects bank-
ruptcy litigation is atypical, for the most part it utilizes judicial pro-
cedure and judicial processes common to all civil litigation. In recent
years an even greater uniformity and interchangeability of procedures
have been developing, resulting in an increasing similarity between bank-
ruptcy and other litigation, a result evidenced, for example, by discovery
procedures and by appellate procedure.
Discovery in bankruptcy has its own peculiar history, overborne
by the section 21(a) examination. That examination is a creature of
statute designed to allow the whereabouts of the assets of the bankrupt
to be ascertained in order to recover them for distribution. Although it
is itself and by case law somewhat limited, its scope is broad." 2 Section
21(a) provides that:
The court may, upon application of any officer, bankrupt,
or creditor, by order require any designated persons, including
the bankrupt and his or her spouse, to appear before the court
or before the judge of any State court, to be examined concern-
ing the acts, conduct, or property of a bankrupt .... 1'8
While not strictly an ancestor of modern discovery, which primarily
developed from equity," 4 section 21(a) certainly is a forerunner." 5
With the advent and refinements of modern discovery occurring since
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and
thereafter, it has become desirable to fully incorporate the federal dis-
covery procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into bank-
ruptcy practice." 6 Insofar as was possible by procedural changes, the
Supreme Court accomplished this with the promulgation of General
Order 37, which states:
In proceedings under the [Bankruptcy] Act the Rules of
112. Section 21(a) limits examination of the bankrupt's spouse by providing that:
Provided, That the spouse may be examined only touching business transacted by
such spouse or to which such spouse is a party and to determine the fact whether
such spouse has transacted or been a party to any business of the bankrupt:
And provided further, That the spouse may be so examined, any law of the United
States or of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 11 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (1969).
Additionally, use of evidence to establish the insolvency of the bankrupt or acts of bank-
ruptcy has been circumscribed. See In re Stell, 269 F. 1008, 1009 (E.D. Tex. 1920) ; Abbot
v. Wauchula Mfg. & Timber Co., 229 F. 677, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1916); Rawlins v. Hall-Epps
Clothing Co., 217 F. 884, 885-87 (5th Cir. 1914).
113. 11 U.S.CA. § 44(a) (1969).
114. See Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 940, 946-51
(1961).
115. See Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 302 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1962).
116. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules certain federal statutes allowing various
forms of discovery had been held to be incorporated into section 21(a). See 2 CoL.,axa oN
BANiKuPTcy It 21.25[1] (1968).
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Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act or with
these general orders, be followed as nearly as may be .... "I
Not only are discovery procedures in federal practice, including
bankruptcy, essentially uniform, but appellate procedure is as well. The
new Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective July 1, 1968, apply
to bankruptcy appeals as well as to appeals from other types of litigation
in providing for appeals by allowance,1 8 by permission under section
1292 (b), 119 and as of right. 120 Bankruptcy did retain some differentiation
from other appeals by necessitating the provisions for appeals by allow-
ance under Rule 6, which is applicable to such appeals, but because these
appeals are limited to those involving less than $500 it is doubtful
that this provision will be often used or the appeals often allowed. The
purpose behind promulgating the new rules was to make appellate
procedure uniform, there having been variations from circuit to circuit
prior to them. In bankruptcy the most immediate effect has been the
change in appeal time to within thirty days after entry of judgment,
although it has been argued that they in effect eliminate interlocutory
appeals in "proceedings" except upon allowance. 2' (The argument is
not sound.) 122
117. Gen. Order No. 37, General Orders in Bankruptcy Adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States. See also Gen. Order No. 22 (taking of testimony).
118. Fed. R. App. P. 6.
119. Fed. R. App. P. 5.
120. Fed. R. App. P. 3, 4.
121. See Brief of Appellee, Schwarz & Cohen v. Brock, No. 26685 (5th Cir., Nov. 8,
1968).
122. The argument is faulty because if there was prior to the new rules a right of
appeal, the new rules, affecting only procedure, could not alter it. It would remain sub-
stantive law unaffected by the rules. Additionally, it would be a right affecting the juris-
diction of the courts of appeals and could not be affected under the terms of the rules
themselves.
The new rules are derived in pertinent part from the authority vested in the Supreme
Court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2075 (Bankruptcy Rules). See Advisory Committee's Notes to
Fed. R. App. P. 1. Section 2075 states:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
under the Bankruptcy Act.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect. (Emphasis added.)
As the Advisory Committee noted, Notes to Rule 1, supra, "[bly the terms of the
statutes, after the [new] rules have taken effect all laws in conflict with them are of no
further force or effect." This, however, also by the terms of the statutes, does not mean
that any law conferring a substantive right is of no further force or effect. Insofar as
bankruptcy is concerned the primary effect seems to have been to have made appeal time
uniform. See Advisory Committee's Notes to Fed. R. App. P. 6. Admittedly, Rule 4, which
covers appeals as of right in bankruptcy, omits the phrase "either interlocutory or final."
That phrase, however, would be superfluous, as both are in bankruptcy. In view of the
express statutory limitations and the limitations of Rule 1(b), which states that the "rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as estab-
lished by law," the argument has scant merit.
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In interpreting section 24 and attempting to apply its terms, the
emphasis should be placed on property rather than on process. It is from
administration of the bankrupt's estate, rather than from judicial pro-
cedures, that use of the term "proceedings in bankruptcy" should be
prompted. The term "proceedings in bankruptcy" is a term of art and it
should be used as such.
Unfortunately, the word "proceeding" is commonly used to describe
judicial processes, and the same could be said of "controversy." Virtually
all litigation at one time or another is referred to as a proceeding. Indeed,
in the Act itself and in General Order 37, the word at times is accorded
its common usage. Common parlance, however, is inapplicable and
dangerous in attempting to interpret and apply section 24. In section 24
the word should be used, according to its general definitions, as being
applicable to normal steps in the administration of the bankrupt's estate.
It is through this approach to use of the term that distinctions be-
tween actions which should, and actions which should not, be held to be
"proceedings" begin to achieve a measure of consistency. A distinction
should be made between discovery orders, for example, and other steps
which administer assets, as for example orders appointing or removing a
trustee, orders that property be sold or distributed, orders allowing or
rejecting claims and liens, and turnover orders. The former are common
to virtually all courts; the latter are peculiar to bankruptcy administra-
tion.
It is through this vantage that consistencies and inconsistencies ap-
pear. It is suggested that discovery orders in bankruptcy should be
appealable to the same extent and in the same manner as discovery
orders elsewhere. The same holds true for orders holding a party in civil
contempt. Such orders are no more than procedural orders, in the case
of the former, or orders and process issuing to preserve the dignity and
jurisdiction of the court in the case of the latter. They are not peculiar to
bankruptcy; neither do they administer, except peripherally through
the judicial process itself, the assets of the bankrupt's estate.
It seems anomalous to apply procedural devices to bankruptcy with
the result of effectually extending the jurisdiction of the courts of ap-
peals. To do so in effect seems to constitute legislation. There is no
apparent reason for allowing interlocutory appeals in bankruptcy but
not elsewhere, except in circumstances where the peculiarities of bank-
ruptcy should require them. The purpose of enacting section 24 to allow
interlocutory appeals was to provide an exception to the normal rule
requiring finality, and the extension of jurisdiction should be narrowly
construed. By a return to the general definitions of "proceedings" and an
analysis of the effect of a particular order on the administration of the
estate, rather than its peripheral effect upon judicial supervision of the
administration, it is suggested that courts will better be able to classify
particular proceedings as "proceedings."
